The Production of Knowledge

Enhancing Progress in Social Science

Edited by

Colin Elman
Maxwell School of Syracuse University

John Gerring
University of Texas at Austin

James Mahoney
Northwestern University

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16 What's Wrong with Replicating the Old Boys' Networks?

Dawn Langan Teele

Things were supposed to be different for my generation. Old arguments about women not having the necessary credentials – prestigious internships, professional school degrees, and a decent amount of on-the-job experience – or about the rational economic basis of wage disparities due to time out of the labor force – have become increasingly tenuous as American women surpassed men in higher education, and as the highest ever number of women remained in the workforce even during key childbearing years.[1] And yet in every industry and most cultural domains, the old boys' network remains firmly in place.[2] The academic professions, and the social sciences in particular, are no exception. This chapter reflects on the power dynamics and everyday practices that reproduce the gender hierarchy in academia. Although women's experiences may be similar across institutions, I focus primarily on some of the major gender disparities in research universities, as the dual imperatives to publish and contribute to university life lead to a narrative that, especially for women, academia is not compatible with other pursuits like marriage and inter-generational care.[3]

[1] As Goldin et al. (2006) show, since 1960 women have been slightly more likely than men to receive a BA (figure 2); women born later in the century who would have been 30 around 2000 were twice as likely to be employed full-time than women earlier in the century (table 5). By 2000, women were as likely to have had high-school-level courses in math and science, and were more likely to have taken high-school-level chemistry (figure 5).

[2] For a sense of the persistence of the old boys' network in other fields, see #timesup – in film, women are dramatically under-represented among directors, and female megastars are under-paid vis-à-vis male stars. In Fortune-500 companies, women made up only 4 percent of CEOs in 2016 (Zarya 2016). In law, women are 44 percent of associates, but only 21.5 percent of income partners and 18 percent of equity partners. Notably, 100 percent of firms with both men and women report that their top-paid partner is a man (Rikleen 2015:2–3). Across occupations, pharmacy appears to be the sole exception: it has the smallest gender wage gap and also has smaller racial and ethnic wage differentials than any other field that requires a college degree (Goldin and Katz 2016:732).

[3] See Ward and Wolf-Wendel (2012) on the "narratives of constraint" in academia. Chapter 7 in their book considers work-life issues for women in non-research universities.

Anyone who has thought about power understands that people who have to constantly justify their presence in a particular setting obviously don't have much of it. When multiple people carrying similarly identifiable ascriptive characteristics find themselves in this situation, there is a sense among them and among non-group members that they do not belong.[4] Feminist and anti-racist theorists describe this phenomenon with reference to an unexamined norm about which type of person rightfully circulates through certain institutions, creating a group that is "unmarked" by difference. The flip side of this is of course the "marked" groups, those that stand out because of the obvious ways that they deviate from the standard.

With some exceptions, institutions of higher education excluded women, Jews, and people of color until the 1970s, and this history of exclusion has rendered the unmarked group in colleges and universities white men of European origin.[5] In the recent and more distant past, the cultural traditions, social services, and curricula of these institutions were designed with this group in mind. Everyone else, including white women, was understood as non-traditional students for whom it was and is necessary to make special accommodations. Special accommodations for marked groups have included, but are not limited to, separate dorms, ladies' bathrooms, the hiring of professors with similar gender/race profiles, the creation of supplementary tutoring and writing centers, and a push to teach subjects outside of the Western canon. Given the very different demographic faces of colleges and universities today, it makes sense that we should have experienced some growing pains on the path toward inclusion. But, as should be clear to anyone following stories of how campuses handle sexual assault cases (by athletes, by fraternity brothers, and by acquaintances), universities regularly shield their traditional constituents from social and legal sanctions.[6] The same is true,

[4] There are robust debates about whether people with similar ascriptive characteristics (like gender presentation) are actually members of a "group," but many scholars draw on Conover (1988:53), who argues that group consciousness – a politicized awareness of membership and commitment to collective action – requires a non-trivial number of people to identify with a group.

[5] For a highly readable account of coeducational reforms in the Ivy League, see Malkiel (2016). Interestingly, the Ivies were not among the first to experiment with mixed-gender education, but once they transitioned most other schools followed suit.

[6] See Sanday's (1990) book on campus sexual assault, which argues in line with her earlier work that social groups that isolate men from women produce more violence toward women, and which documents universities' turgid disciplinary structures. See too the recent documentary "The Hunting Ground." Recent investigations into campus assault at Columbia and Barnard, under the "SHIFT" program, found that by senior year, 36 percent of female undergraduates had experienced some form of sexual assault compared with almost 16 percent of male undergraduates. Mellins et al. (2017:table 2).

as we have learned recently, for faculty members, even those whose sexually predatory behavior has long been an open secret.[7] Even though women in the United States have now surpassed men in earning bachelors' degrees, the university setting is still a place where gender inequality prevails.[8]

In the following pages I describe a series of interconnected institutional practices that proscribe gender roles in the academy and cement women's inferior status. These practices include all the nuts and bolts of teaching and mentorship – from selection of readings for syllabi to the formation of collaborative research teams – as well as the implicit and explicit biases that limit the recognition of women's work – including the citation of sources in scholarly bibliographies and implicit assumptions about who contributed what to group work. Finally, I describe how practices of performance evaluation, compensation, and opportunities to engage in university leadership that are integral to the way that research universities conduct business almost guarantee the continued exploitation of women in academia.[9] Although there are some open research questions, the evidentiary body of work that I draw on is enormous, and paints a very clear picture of systematic exclusion. Readers can consult the footnotes for very detailed descriptions of the research on which I draw. In the penultimate section, I address the prospects of diversity in the social sciences moving forward and describe ways in which academics and university personnel might constructively work to upend gender domination in our disciplines. In the conclusion I argue that replicating the old boys' network is not only a problem of justice, but also one that impedes knowledge.

Women in the Academic Pipeline

Higher education first blossomed in the United States in the late nineteenth century, and in the early phases of expansion some women were present. In

[7] www.chronicle.com/interactives/harvard-harassment.

[8] Goldin et al. (2006:figures 2 and 3) actually argue that women were as likely to be enrolled in college and receive bachelors' degrees until after the 1915 birth cohort. The low point in women's representation in college came in 1947. Thereafter, the male-to-female ratio fell, reaching parity in the late 1960s. Today, women outnumber men in college.

[9] The term exploitation is appropriate, in its technical sense, for two reasons. First, universities' prestige comes from the research, teaching, and service activities of its faculty, but they achieve prestige by under-paying female faculty (and support staff) and by relying on a large academic precariat that is mostly female to carry many these burdens. Second, because of the gender pay gap, academic institutions contribute to the persistence of women's exploitation in the home. See Folbre (1982) for a discussion of how this operates within capitalism more generally.



Figure 16.1 Women's representation among faculty and doctoral recipients, 1870–2015

Percent of women among all faculty in post-secondary degree-granting institutions (dash-dot), among doctoral recipients in all fields (dot), and doctoral recipients within all social science fields.

Source: author's calculations using NSF Survey of earned doctorates 2004–2007 and the Digest of Education Statistics (Snyder et al. 2016).

1869, American degree-granting post-secondary institutions employed 5,553 individual faculty, 12 percent of whom were women. A decade later, when the size of universities doubled, women made up 36.4 percent of the faculty. From 1889 until 1989 – that is, for a century – women held between 20 and 30 percent of all faculty positions; thereafter, their presence soared, reaching 49 percent by 2014. Thus, it is fair to say that women were not a major part of post-secondary institutions until the late 1970s.[10]

Figure 16.1 presents the long historical picture of women's representation in higher education, plotting the percent of women among doctoral recipients in all fields, the percent of women among faculty in all fields, and, for the 1960s onwards, women's share of social science doctorates.[11] In the early

[10] The Digest of Education Statistics (Snyder et al. 2016:table 301.20) provides a historical summary of faculty, enrollment, degrees conferred, and finances in degree-granting post-secondary institutions for selected years from 1869–1870 through 2014–2015. Importantly, faculty employment is recorded based on the number of individuals, not full-time equivalents (FTEs).

[11] NSF Survey of earned doctorates 2004–2007. The 2004 edition, tables 5 and 7, records doctorates by sex and major field going back to 1974.

twentieth century the number of doctorates issued was relatively small – from 54 in 1879 (women were 5.6 percent), growing to 615 in 1919 (where women were 15.1 percent). Until 1975, women held fewer than 20 percent of all new doctorates. Thereafter, with a growth of slightly less than a percentage point per year, women reached 2014 earning 46 percent of all doctorates.

The several disciplines within the social sciences have varied in their level of openness to women (see Figure 16.2, top). Among undergraduates, sociology and anthropology graduate a disproportionate number of women – something like 70 percent of all bachelors' degrees in from 2000 to 2015 were earned by women– while political science is at parity. The dismal science has, it would seem, struggled the most to recruit female undergraduates: somewhere between 33 and 30 percent of all undergraduate majors are women, with a small decline since the turn of the century. Doctoral degrees awarded to women follow a similar pattern, albeit with a downward shift in the share of women in all fields (Figure 16.2, bottom). Between 30 and 35 percent of PhDs awarded in economics are to women, in political science it is nearer 40 percent, and in sociology and anthropology around 60 percent of PhDs granted in the past 10 years have been to women. Although some disciplines do not reach parity, and others over-represent women, most of the social sciences are appealing to female undergraduates and graduate PhDs, suggesting a healthy "pipeline" for the academic social sciences.[12]

In the ranks of the professoriate there have been several significant changes in women's representation.[13] Recent data from major academic associations show that among faculty on the tenure ladder, women make up a smaller portion of full professors than associate professors, but there is a large share of women clustered at the untenured ranks. In political science as of 2016, women made up 27 percent of ladder faculty in the 20 largest PhD-granting departments, but were 38 percent of untenured faculty.[14] In economics in 2017, 126 departments with doctoral programs reported that 28.8 percent of assistant professors were women, while women make up 20 percent of all economics faculty on the ladder track.[15] In sociology, despite the fact that women

[12] Stock (2017:648) argues that women and minorities have increasingly chosen economics as a second major, suggesting that the pipeline for PhDs in social sciences may be larger than these numbers.

[13] Economics data from 2017 survey and report on the Committee on the Status of Women in the profession, table 1 (AEA 2018). They pertain to 126 PhD-granting departments measured in 2017.

[14] See APSA P-WAM20, and Teele and Thelen (2017:438). Alter et al. (2018) find a similar pattern of higher shares of women at lower ranks in political science for an even larger number of departments than recorded in the P-WAM data.

[15] In 1994, the economics data show that only 12.7 percent of all ladder faculty were women, but at that time women made up 24.2 percent of assistant professors. The comparison with 2017 may not be exact, however, as the 1994 data cover 80 instead of 126 departments, and no weighting is given.



Figure 16.2 Women's representation among undergraduates and doctoral recipients in the social sciences

Percent of women among undergraduate majors (top), and doctoral recipients (bottom), by social science field.

Source: author's calculations from Stock (2017) using the IPEDS survey, and NSF (2018) data on doctorates awarded.

comprise more than 50 percent of members in the discipline, they make up less than 40 percent of most of the top 12 departments, and the 100 top universities still disproportionately hire men (Akbaritabar and Squazzoni 2018). Economics showed a similar pattern where, from 1985 to 2004, the top 50 American economics departments hired on average just four women assistant professors compared to an average of 17 men, with only a slight increase in women hires in 2005 relative to 1985 (Antecol, Bedard, and Stearns 2018).

On the whole, the growth in the share of women that enter as assistant professors is consistent with the gradual advancement of women in the academic profession. Yet there are two concerns. First, as Alter et al. (2018) point out, research universities with very high levels of research output employ the largest number of faculty overall, and, within these universities, full professors make up the largest faculty group. Since the largest gender gap in representation is at the rank of professor, and most of the prestigious positions in the profession go to members of high-output research universities, there are way fewer women in the immediate feeder group for high-status positions.

Second, even though the gender distribution looks more promising at the assistant professor rank, it is no guarantee that the future will be much different. Indeed, women face higher rates of tenure denial in the social sciences. Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2015) track the careers of 2,218 social science faculty that took positions in 19 research universities (public, private, and polytechnic) in seven social science disciplines from 1990 to 2003. Overall, they find that women were less likely to achieve tenure than men.[16] In economics, Antecol, Bedard, and Stearns (2018) present data on tenure rates for men and women in 49 of the top 50 departments in the United States. They show that for men and women who got took their first job from 1980 to 2005 – who vary from being in their 60s to being in their 40s today – average rates of tenure were much higher for men (33 percent) than women (20 percent). For those who took their first jobs in 2005, 35 percent of men earned

[16] Looking within academic discipline, Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2015) find that in all fields but psychology, there is a positive correlation between being male and being promoted, though these correlations are only statistically significant for economics (in one specification) and sociology (in two specifications). They do not find differences in the time to full professor for men and women, conditional on having received tenure (figure 4). This research bolsters earlier findings by Kahn (1993:54), who studied tenure differences by gender in the economics field for those who received PhDs from 1971 to 1980. Although time to tenure narrowed in later cohorts, women were more likely to remain untenured many years after receiving a PhD. The Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2015) publication does not addresses tenure differences for racial and ethnic minorities, but Kahn (1993:55) found that in economics, tenure rates were similar for black and Native American faculty as for white faculty. For

tenure compared to 23 percent of women. In the fields of sociology, computer science, and English, Weisshaar (2017:tables 1 and 3) evaluated tenure rates among faculty hired from 2000 to 2004. She randomly sampled 1,500 assistant professors from ranked research universities, over-sampling from the top 30 departments. The raw difference of means suggests that a gender tenure gap exists in all fields both in one's first job and in any position. In sociology (n = 475), 85 percent of men received tenure in any job compared with 78 percent of women. The gender tenure gap is 7.3 percentage points in general and 9.1 percentage points in the first job.[17]

Some might wonder whether gender differences in productivity, or procreative choices, may explain this outcome, but Ginther and Kahn (2004) found that even when controlling for publication, a 17-percent gender gap in tenure rates still persisted in Economics. Weisshaar (2017) finds that gender tenure gap that is unexplained by productivity, years of experience, or departmental characteristics is massive. About 45 percent of the gender tenure gap is unexplained in sociology, 40 percent unexplained in computer science, and 90 percent unexplained in English. These seem like huge differences to pin on talent or some other unobserved characteristic.

Scholars working on the "Do Babies Matter?" literature found that women who had children within five years of completing a PhD were much less likely to receive tenure than men or other women who did not have children in that period.[18] However, Wolfinger et al. (2008) contend that having children did not negatively affect tenure rates for women (table 2; n = 10,845) but rather that having children made it less likely that the female academics would get an initial tenure-track job in the first place (table 1, n = 30,568).[19] It is possible that the gender gap in tenure rates is not due to productivity differences or fertility choices, but instead is related to double standards in the assessment of scholars' work. Indeed, new research suggests that men and women's publication track records may be evaluated differently, with

more on racial differences in tenure rates, see the discussion in www.chronicle.com/article/Tenure-Decisions-at-Southern/135754.

[17] In computer science (n = 606) 86 percent of men and 90.5 percent of women received any tenure. There was a gap of 5.7 points in any job and 4.7 points in first job. Finally, in English (n = 478) 86 percent of men and 8 percent of women received tenure in any school. The gap was 6.2 points in the any school and 9 points in the first school. This is in spite of the fact that men in English were slightly more likely to move. Weisshaar (2017:tables 1 and 3).

[18] Mason, Goulden, and Wolfinger (2006).

[19] Wolfinger et al. (2008) studied the procurement of a tenure-track job, time to tenure, and promotion to full tenure for a large random sample from the Survey of Earned Doctorates for those who earned

women getting less credit for collaborative research during tenure decisions (Sarsons 2017).

To summarize, while women's representation among graduate students and early-career faculty in the social sciences has increased over time, most research suggests that there is a big a disparity in women's ability to advance through the career ladder.

Wolfinger et al.'s (2008) findings – that women are less likely to take tenure-track jobs than men – raise the possibility that women find more opportunities for contingent or adjunct work among the academic "precariat." In economics, 36 percent of non-ladder faculty in PhD-granting departments were female in 2017, up from 29.6 percent in 1994.[20] In political science, 33 percent of non-ladder faculty in the top 20 largest PhD-granting departments were female. The fact that women make up a larger share of faculty that are *not* on the ladder than they do of tenure-track faculty suggests that less-prestigious jobs may have fewer barriers to entry for female academics. However, as Kathy Thelen (2019:figure 1) argued in her presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 2018, this is hardly an achievement. The growth of contingent contracts in academia has far outpaced positions in tenure lines. Since these positions are often ineligible for benefits and offer little flexibility and low levels of remuneration, they undergird an academic "precariat" that mirrors the gig-economy more generally.

Departments differ in the degree to which women's representation is achieved through non-ladder faculty appointments. In political science, schools like the University of Michigan stand out, both for the high overall share of women in its academic staff (just shy of 40 percent) and because none of this representation is generated by non-ladder positions. On the other hand, there are schools like Harvard, where seemingly 40 percent of its academic staff in political science is women, but where less than 8 percent of the total are in ladder positions.[21] Both Michigan and Harvard are top departments in political science, yet they have quite distinct patterns of gender representation: one where women are found solely in the more prestigious tenure ladder positions, while the other makes up for tenure-track gender imbalances through non-ladder positions. These different strategies of diversification likely have implications for the culture of these departments

PhDs from 1981 to 1985. Women were 21 percent less likely to get tenure and, conditional on being tenured, women are less likely to be promoted to full professor.

[20] The 2017 economics data cover 126 departments, while the 1994 data cover 80 departments.

[21] APSA (2016), P-WAM data.

for faculty and for graduate students, and for the opportunities for women and minorities to succeed.[22]

As we saw in the figures above, the various fields of the social sciences differ in the extent of women's representation among undergraduate students, PhD recipients, and faculty members. Although there have been some notable shifts in the composition of the professoriate, the remainder of this chapter argues that there are two domains in which current academic practices reflexively reproduce white male power: the normative construction of disciplinary centrality and the market-oriented compensation structure of universities. Norms and practices produce differential visibility of scholars' work, and market-oriented compensation structures, which often reward research that fits into dominant constructions of disciplinary centrality, reinforce women's marginality in the academy and, through lower wages, in society writ large.

The Normative Construction of Disciplinary Centrality

Whose work is on the lists of great books? Whose research counts as seminal when we are writing theory sections? Which literatures are cutting-edge and which are outdated? Who is assigned in graduate survey courses? Which references are cut when we are looking to make space in our word counts? Who gets invited to panels? Who gives conference keynotes? The answers to each of these questions go a long way to explaining how men have been and are currently understood as leaders in our fields.

Before describing the construction of disciplinary centrality, it is worth establishing that women have been present and writing in the social sciences for a long time. Figure 16.3 presents data on female authorships in four social science disciplines from 1950 to 2000. It lists the number of times per decade in which a female-gendered name appears in the bylines of research articles catalogued by JSTOR. Several things stand out from this figure. First, in the 1950s, sociology boasted the largest number of female authorships, 1,140, while political science, with 32 female authorships, was the lowest.

[22] There is an enormous literature that looks at how descriptive representation of non-dominant groups impacts the aspirations of other non-dominant groups. Many scholars stress that role models impact peoples' sense of belonging in a particular field (e.g., Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; Beaman et al. 2008; Gilardi 2015). Several studies examine women as role models in education: on educational attainment based on having female high school teachers (Nixon and Robinson 1999); Rask and Bailey (2002) find that when women and minorities took classes with a professor that resembled their ascriptive characteristics, they were more likely to choose that field as a major; Bettinger and Long (2005); Brajer and Gill (2010) found that female business school professors were more likely to respond to female students than male professors.



Figure 16.3 Gender and authorships in various social science disciplines, 1950–2000

The figure displays the overall number of authorships in each field by decade, and the gender breakdown of these authorships. The top number on each bar lists female authorships in that decade based on the number of times a discernable female name appears in the byline of a social science journal article as catalogued by JSTOR. The number of non-identifiable names increases over time, so these numbers likely under-state women's authorships.

Source: author's calculations using King et al. (2017)

Second, anthropology and political science experienced rapid growth in female authorships in the 1960s and 1970s, while female authorships in economics and sociology exploded in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, the rate of growth was much faster in anthropology and in sociology. Finally, the rate at which women publish is not strictly related to market size, or to how many authorships exist in each field: sociology has the second-largest authorship pool and the highest representation of women in its bylines.[23]

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that many women have worked and published successfully in the social sciences for more than 30 years, and that new research shows that articles written by women have the virtue of more readable prose,[24] research bylined by men populates most of the disciplines' top "generalist" journals in most social science fields,[25] it gets more disciplinary recognition, and dominates the core graduate syllabi in my own field of political science.[26]

Consider the issue of gender diversity on syllabi in political science. Political theory (which consists of political philosophy, history of political thought, critical theory, and normative theory), has the largest share of female scholars of any field in political science, yet it has been critiqued for its attachment to a white male canon.[27] Some might argue that the male (and European-origin) cast of characters that appear in core courses on the "ancients" and the "moderns" is reasonable given that women were not taught to read or write until late in history. And indeed, when we consider the known work of the ancients from Europe this appears to be more or less true (Sappho being the exception).[28] But when we get to modern European and American political thought, the

[23] Because Figure 16.2 is describing authorships, rather than unique authors in a discipline, high rates of co-authorship drive up the number of authorships in the y-axis of the bar graph.

[24] Hengel (2017) evaluates 9,123 abstracts from articles published in four top economics journals (AER, *Econometrica*, JPE, and QJE) finding a 1–6-percent gap in readability in favor of women. Women's prose improves in the review process, which Hengel suspects is linked to a higher level of scrutiny applied to women's work. Examining a smaller sample of 2,446 articles published in *Econometrica*, she finds that female-authored papers take six months longer in peer review, likely contributing to the publication gap between men and women (Hengel 2017:figure V).

[25] Teele and Thelen (2017) find that women comprise a much lower share of authors in most top journals than their representation in the discipline as a whole. Articles published in journals like the AJPS and APSR are bylined by women about 19 percent of the time. There is an inverse correlation between the proportion of work that is quantitative that appears in a journal's pages and the proportion of women among authors (Akbaritabar and Squazzoni 2018).

[26] There is an enormous literature on gender citation gaps cited in the footnotes of this text. Recently, Samuels and Teele (2018) find that in political science, books written by women get dramatically fewer citations ten years after publication.

[27] For an elaboration of this critique, see Charles Mills (2014:71), who calls attention to the lack of reflexivity of "white academic philosophy," and Pateman and Mills (2007), who examine social contract theory in light of both gender and racial subordination.

[28] Notably, there is now an entire field of "comparative" political theory that seeks to highlight the intellectual contributions of non-white non-European interlocutors. See Simon (2018) for a review.

absence of female thinkers is more questionable. Responding to this critique, many graduate courses contain secondary scholarship written by women, rendering theory syllabi some of the least gender-segregated in political science (Hardt et al. 2019).

Recent pushes for a more "comparative" political theory have brought non-white and non-Western thinkers into the mix, but most of these figures are great men from other cultures. In other words, there has not been a fundamental mission to re-define the canon, or re-define how canons are constructed, in political theory.[29] Great books classes at the graduate level and core courses for undergraduates do assign Mary Wollstonecraft, and they may also contain pamphlets by the Grimké sisters, or an account of a famous speech given by Sojourner Truth. But many scholars insist that most of the great thinkers or central interlocutors during the Industrial Revolution, belle époque, or Gilded Age that come to mind were men. And yet, scholars who have read the archives of those periods, who have studied the social movements and revolutions of which women formed key parts (abolition, suffrage, moral reform, temperance), now understand that, just as in the present day, women's intellectual contributions – their pamphlets, speeches, and periodicals – have been erased from our histories and political philosophies. The problem, as the renowned historian Karen Offen put it, is not lack of history; it is amnesia.[30]

Amnesia, or perhaps more insidious forces, has also been at play in erasing the contributions of black political thinkers to the field of international relations. As my colleague at the University of Pennsylvania Bob Vitalis shows in his sweeping new history of the field, much of what we now think of as IR actually emerged from the writings of a group of black male professors critiquing the interventionist policies of the early twentieth century. Here too it isn't that nothing has been written by non-white men; it's that what was written was cribbed, without attribution, and then the footprints were systematically covered over.[31] (This erasure was made easier by the exclusion of black people from the faculties of our most prestigious institutions.)

Several recent investigations into the core graduate seminars in political science reveal the prevalence of these behaviors in other political science

[29] Although see Simon (2019) for an account of comparative political theory's attempt to bring non-Western thinkers into the conversation.

[30] Offen (2000:17). One need not lower their standards of relevancy: Offen's 400-page magisterial book focuses solely on the writings and political arguments of women that were part of a public debate from 1700 to 1950. The prologue is an excellent and moving introduction to the burying of women's past by the academic field of history.

[31] Vitalis (2015). People also voice concerns in comparative politics and international relations that our fields are too US-centric insofar as we rely on research that emanates from US institutions and American authors. If you are studying another country, are you aware of what authors from that country have written (Robles 1993:526)?

subfields: Hardt et al. (2019) find that 18.7 percent of first authors on graduate syllabi are women, with methods courses boasting the lowest representation of women (around 10 percent of authors taught in methods classes are female). Colgan (2017) culled graduate syllabi in "core" IR courses from 42 US universities, producing a list of 3,343 required-reading assignments. In these core courses, Colgan found male authors wrote 82 percent of assigned readings (the articles were bylined either by a man working alone or an all-male team). In a secondary analysis, Colgan found that when a woman taught the class, 71.5 percent of all assigned readings were authored by men, but when men taught the class, this percentage rose to 79.1.[32]

What does it mean that we don't assign women or people of color in core classes? Several things. It means that early on, students will cite fewer works by women (insofar as they draw on writings they encountered in classes), and that the overall network of thinkers to which students are exposed will have fewer women in them overall.[33] This is because male authors tend to cite women less than do female authors, meaning that if students pursue research by using a man's bibliography as the basis for their work, they will encounter fewer female authors in the process.[34] If one does not encounter women in core courses, comprehensive exam lists, or the bibliographies of research papers and books written by men, then it is easy to assume that women have

[32] See also Diament et al. (2018) on syllabi in American politics. Hardt et al. (2018) study 905 PhD syllabi in political science and find that only 19 percent of required readings had female first authors but 28 percent of instructors were women.

[33] Nexon 2013.

[34] Maliniak, Powers, and Walter's (2013) network analysis in the political science sub-discipline of IR shows that women are cited less overall, but especially by men. Mitchell, Lange, and Brus (2013) find that in a top international relations Journal – *ISQ* – 83 percent of men's citation are to research bylined by just men, while 57 percent of women's citations are to articles bylined by just men (table 2). In *ISP*, another journal, they find similar citation patterns by men but, with a smaller sample, find women cite more work written by just men. Overall, women are more than twice as likely to cite research by female authors. In economics, Ferber and Brün (2011:table 1) examine the gender citation gap in economics. They differentiate between papers bylined by women (working alone or in pairs), those bylined by men (alone or in pairs), or co-ed teams. In 2008, when women worked alone or with other women, women wrote 12.7 percent of articles they cited. When men worked alone, only 5.9 percent of articles they cited were written by women. Each type of group – men alone, women alone, and co-ed teams – was about as equally likely to cite the work of coed teams (about 13.6 versus 15.6 percent). To put it another way, male authors referred to research in which women participated less than 20 percent of the time, while female authors referred to the work of women 29 percent of the time. Similar patterns emerged in bibliographies of papers in the field of labor economics. As an applied field, labor economics has been home to a high proportion of female economists, and yet men working alone refer to the work of women alone in only 9.4 percent of their citations, while women working with women cite the work of all-women bylines 17.3 percent of the time.

not made intellectual contributions to that field of knowledge. In this way, the gender bias that produced the course lists reproduces itself.

To give a sense of the magnitude of the problem, consider an extraordinary recent paper that examined 1.5 million journal articles published between 1779 and 2011. King et al. (2017) find that, across all fields, about 9.4 percent of references in research articles were self-citations, that is, they referred to previous research of one of the listed authors. But there were big gender differences in these patterns: about 31 percent of articles written by men refer to their own work versus 21 percent of articles written by women, meaning that men were more than 10 percentage points more likely to self-cite. Within the social sciences, men self-cited more in every field: men were 1.36 percent more likely to self-cite in anthropology, 1.43 percent more likely in sociology, 1.58 percent more likely in political science, 1.65 percent more likely in economics. Because women self-cite less than men, and are less likely to be cited by men, one of the key metrics of academic success is downward-biased in women's tenure files.[35]

One final issue that impacts the normative construction of disciplinary centrality has to do with methods. Speaking as a relatively young professor, I would note that amnesia is not only about systematically ignoring the work of non-white, non-male scholars, but also about downplaying the utility of knowledge that has been accumulated by our disciplinary forebears. To some degree, this forgetting is necessary. If we already knew what everyone said, the delusion of originality that is central to writing a dissertation would be impossible to maintain. And indeed, when we start to actually read it does seem like there is nothing new under the sun (or at least, in my field, something that hasn't already been said by Theda Skocpol or Maurice Duverger). But there is perhaps another reason that younger generations brashly ignore the work of the old, and that has to do with method.

So long as social scientists are hoping to uncover "objective" facts, we may be perennially unimpressed by what someone said 20 years ago. New documents, new data, and new methodologies each serve to undermine the work of earlier generations. Nevertheless, even if, methodologically, we no longer believe former scholars' assumptions, we may be likelier to give credence to work from 20 years ago that used numbers and models rather than work that

[35] In the political science field of IR, women are less likely to self-cite (Maliniak et al. 2013), and Colgan (2017) shows that women also assign less of their own work in classes. In non-core courses on International Relations, male professors assign 3.18 readings that they authored, on average, while women assign 1.68 readings that they authored. See Hendrix (2015) for a thoughtful analysis of citation indices in political science.

used mere words. This is because academics tend to prize sophisticated statistical and mathematical techniques. Across academic disciplines, some fields are considered to require more "innate" talent than others – in STEM fields this includes math, physics, engineering and computer science, while in the social sciences and humanities philosophy is considered to require the most innate ability (Leslie et al. 2015:figure 1). In general, those fields that require "brilliance" tend to be the most white-male-dominated, while those fields where innate ability is believed to be less important award a much higher share of PhDs to women and to African Americans (Leslie et al. 2015:figures 1 and 2). There is an additional layer of gender divisions within disciplines, where women are more frequently on the applied ends (e.g., labor and development in economics, instead of macro or micro theory), a sorting that can further contribute to the notion of the importance of specific research agendas and the centrality within disciplines.[36]

The path-dependent result of this gendered division of fields and methodology is that fewer women are clustered at the most prestigious ends of the hierarchy. In political science, fewer women run the giant laboratories that are creating multi-authored research articles, and thus the rise in co-authorship that we have witnessed across the discipline has not benefited women equally.[37] This has far-reaching implications for career trajectories, especially if there are no clear standards for how to weight collaborative work against independent research. In addition, because hiring is so competitive, junior people feel the pressure to publish at all costs more acutely than in the past. But to the extent that women have tended to populate the qualitative segments of the discipline, there may be fewer role models and mentors, and higher barriers for junior women to join research teams.

Market-Driven Compensation Structures

A second important way in which the academy reproduces gender domination is through the structure of compensation. Although there is variation in

[36] Although women now match men in their level of high-school exposure to math and sciences, it is clear from looking at membership in the American Political Science Association that there is a gendered division of methodology that has put women's work at the qualitative end of the spectrum. This likely influences the degree to which top journals publish work by women, as these journals publish primarily quantitative research (Teele and Thelen 2017).

[37] Teele and Thelen (2017). Rates of co-authorship for women are higher in top sociology journals (Akbaritabar and Squazzoni 2018).

how colleges and universities structure compensation, many institutions pay women less than men, with estimates between 18 and 23 percent, reduced to 5 to 7 percent when experience, rank, and field are taken into account.[38] Monroe and Chiu (2010:306) use AAUP data for all fields and show that the pay gap is worse the more prestigious the university: a 3-percent average pay gap in community colleges reaches 8 percent in Research 1 universities. The gender pay gap, which begins in entry-level assistant professor positions, is reinforced through practices that are not transparent, and can be compounded over an academic's career by biased remunerative structures.[39]

As many scholars have noted, promotion within research-based academic institutions is linked to research productivity (where the quantity, quality, and the impact of research is taken into account).[40] Although pay typically increases through different levels of promotion (from assistant to associate, associate to full), pay is also affected, in many universities, by the existence of "outside options" – job offers from different venues, including universities. Faculty in some fields appear to have a greater tendency to be on the job market and to move (economics in particular seems to be an outlier), but it is not uncommon for faculty to attempt to bid up their salaries by threatening to leave their home institution. To professionals in many fields, this practice may not be surprising or even problematic. But I submit that this practice is

[38] Comparable data on only the social sciences are hard to come by, but all research shows that women receive lower salaries. Monroe and Chiu (2010) use data from the American Association of University Professors and find large pay gaps across rank and institution type. In a recent economics paper, Langan (2018) finds a raw salary gap of 23 percent, which reduces to a 7-percent gap once experience, faculty rank, and field are taken into account. Toutkoushian and Conley (2005) report a wage gap of 18 percent by the late 1990s, but argue that the proportion of the wage gap that is "unexplained" by field and seniority was less than 5 percent. Looking across departments, female department heads and assistant deans earn about 85 cents on the male dollar, while for deans this is around 82 cents. The gap attenuated to 91 cents on the dollar among female university presidents, although women held less than 30 percent of these positions in 2016 (see figures 6 and 9 from Bichsel and McChesney 2017). According to McChesney (2017:figures 6 and 7), the pay gap for administrators is worse in the female-to-male comparison than in the minority-to-white pay gap, the latter of which hovers close to parity even in less-prestigious universities. A big part of the problem in the administrator pay gap for women comes from the "middle third" of institutions instead of from the "top" institutions. Note, however, that there are far fewer minority administrators (around 20 percent in 2017) than female administrators (around 50 percent in 2017). See also Carr et al. (2015) on academic medicine.

[39] Women suffer from a gender pay gap in nearly all industries and occupations (Blau and Kahn 2000). (See also footnote 2 of this chapter.) Note that the pay gap is not just about the sorting of women into specific "feminized" occupations that are low-paying, but also about pay gaps within occupations. Goldin (1992) provides the example of librarians, where most in the industry are women, but where the highest-paid librarians (e.g., in the Library of Congress) are men.

[40] The quality of teaching and service also matters, but is given different weights at liberal arts institutions versus research universities.

more problematic in the academy than in other fields due to the geographic particularities of university life – where it can be difficult if not impossible to switch jobs without physically moving to another town or city.

Acquiring an outside offer requires, at least in theory, that someone is willing to move to a new place. Discussions of "moveability" therefore crop up in conversations about hiring. As Rivera (2017) shows in a recent article on hiring practices at research universities, women's marital status and family commitments are discussed at a much higher rate on hiring committees than the marital status of male applicants. Implicit in these discussions is the idea that women's family commitments (or having an employed spouse) will make it more difficult for women to switch institutions.[41] It is an open question whether women are in fact less moveable than men, but to the extent that perceptions of moveability matter for interviewing, they also likely matter for receiving outside offers.[42] In a world where women are believed to be less moveable, they are less likely to succeed in securing a key route to pay raises. If there are gendered differences in the ability to secure leverage in the form of outside options, the damage to women's lives extends well beyond monthly paystubs. Indeed, women's lifetime savings will be lower (both because they have less money to save and because programs with "matching" benefits will contribute lower levels to women's 401Ks), and their research productivity is also likely to be lower.

Unequal access to job opportunities and lower pay can depress women's productivity for two reasons. First, faculty members are often able to use outside offers to argue for higher discretionary research budgets. These budgets allow for travel to conduct research, and enable a variety of research tasks to be carried out by others. Research budgets also allow for faculty to gain exposure by attending workshops, panels, and conferences in other locations. Since visibility is linked to citations and citations are linked to impact, lower research budgets depress women's ability to project disciplinary centrality. Note that although the idea that "women don't ask" has found currency among lean-in feminists, political science researchers found that on many dimensions of bargaining, female faculty were more likely to ask for resources

[41] Wolfinger et al. (2008) suggest that geographic constraints are more important for women's career decisions, and female academics are more likely to work in large cities where full-time working spouses can also find work.

[42] Some scholars argue that gender norms produce and reinforce marriages in which men are more successful or earn more than women (Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2015, Schwartz and Gonalons-Pons 2016), and so highly productive women are more likely to have a spouse with a high-powered career than similarly high-powered men.

than men.[43] Persistent disparities in research funds cannot only be pinned on women's lack of chutzpah.

The second way that this market-oriented compensation structure might lower women's productivity is by reducing their ability to outsource domestic labor. With more constrained budgets, female academics likely have to spend more time on household tasks, such as shopping and cleaning, than male acdemics. Since many academics care for others, including children and aging parents, career-related events that happen outside of the normal work-week will require additional coverage. With less income, women may feel the sting of the auxiliary aspects of the academic career particularly acutely. To the extent that male and female academics have similarly demanding travel schedules, the gender pay gap, which renders women's labor in the home less replaceable, imposes higher financial burdens on families when female academics travel. In other words, when women leave the home for research trips or conferences, the family absorbs more negative shocks due to the doubly oppressive nature of the gender pay gap.

Add to this the unmistakable biological burdens of carrying and nursing children, and it is a wonder that any married woman with children can survive in the academy.[44] Although men are certainly more involved in child care than they once were (in 1965 married American men performed 2.6 hours per week of child care compared with 7.2 hours a week in 2009–2010), many women suffer a productivity loss *prior* to the birth of their children.[45] Heightened sleep requirements and increased nutritional needs during pregnancy, along with doctor's appointments, and, if there are complications, many more appointments, mean that many women invest more time in the basic human task of reproduction even if, after babies arrive, men are equal parents.

A final way that the market-oriented structure of pay negatively impacts women (and also potentially people of color) is through a lack of emphasis on "service" work (Thompson 2008). In the research university setting, teaching

[43] Mitchell and Hesli (2013:table 2). Using an APSA faculty survey from 2009, table 3 in the study shows that women were more likely to ask for course releases, RAs, discretionary funds, travel funds, moving expenses, and positions for their partners and spouses. There was no difference in how frequently women asked for summer salary, special tenure clock timing, housing subsidies, child care, or administrative support.

[44] On academic motherhood, see Ward and Wolf-Wendel (2012), Mason, Wolfinger, and Goulden (2013). As Courtney Jung (2015) documents in *Lactivism*, the trappings of middle-class motherhood have become more cumbersome over time. Lots of bad science and guilt reinforce the interminable years spent on breastfeeding, or, more accurately, breastpumping.

[45] Bianchi et al. (2012:table 1).

and advising, though important, are less heavily emphasized in promotion practices. Women and people of color have often alluded to experiencing higher demands for service than they perceive are made on white men. The justifications for these demands range from being the lone "role model" for students and junior faculty from minority groups, to gendered patterns of socialization where women are considered to be more caring and hence better able to perform service duties, to volunteerism among women, to universities desiring diversity on committees (Guarino and Borden 2017:676). If the university wants one woman on every committee, but there are only two women in the department, those two may do a disproportionate amount of committee work. It is also possible that due to a greater emphasis placed on women's "likeability," women may be reluctant to say no to requests for service, especially if they perceive that they will be penalized for saying no (e.g., Babcock et al. 2017a).

Recent scholarship using a large national survey of 140 American institutions with almost 19,000 faculty respondents supports the idea that women do more service than men on average; even after controlling for the type of institution, the field, and the rank of the faculty member, women do 0.6 hours more service per week.[46] Using additional data from faculty activity reports at a large Midwestern research university, Guarino and Borden (2017) further find that women are engaged in 1.4 more hours of service activities than men per year, and that the difference is driven primarily by women's heightened service in their own universities, as opposed to external service to the profession at large. As evidence that some of the added service requirements are driven by a lack of diversity in universities, Guarino and Borden find that the number of women in a given department reduces the service burden of other women in that department. Importantly, although women do more service, they volunteer more frequently for service assignments that do not affect promotion (Babcock et al. 2017b), and they do the work that requires more effort and confers lower professional status (Alter et al. 2018). As Stegmaier, Palmer, and Van Assendelft (2011:801) showed for editorships at political science journals, women are found more frequently among associate editors (23 percent) and editorial board members (26 percent), but it is quite rare that a woman gets to be the sole editor of a major journal (18 percent).

[46] Guarino and Borden (2017:table 1). These figures are based on self-reported activities, which are likely less accurate than time-use surveys. But time-use surveys in household settings have been found to mirror closely self-reported time allocations (Hook 2017).

These heightened service demands for women and faculty of color feeds back into the compensatory scheme in a way that likely depresses wages. To borrow vocabulary from political economy, investing more time in home institutions means that faculty from non-dominant groups develop more "firm specific" capital relative to capital that can be traded on the open academic market.[47] With university-specific capital, women's networks are likely to be more local, and, because heightened service demands likely reduce the amount of time that women and people of color have to dedicate to research activities, they will have fewer of the key academic currency: publications.

In effect, the gender pay gap in academia, less generous research budgets for women, the tendency for women to develop university-specific capital instead of more easily tradable assets, when combined with the household division of labor, and the nature of reproductive biology, all are likely to negatively affect women's research productivity. Importantly, too, there is often a perception that women with families will be less productive, and that they are less moveable, than men. Since leave time, pay, and the size of research budgets are often associated with outside offers, gendered perceptions of dedication to the academic career and the gender pay gap may produce a feedback loop in which the standards for success are not equally attainable to all people. Most likely, these concerns are reflected not only in the labor market experiences for white women, but also constrain the opportunities for people of color.

Remedies for Gender Domination

This chapter has argued that in spite of growing numerical representation of women at many stages of the career pipeline in the social sciences, current practices related to the construction of disciplinary centrality, and the structure of academic labor market in research universities, reinforce women's subordination in the academy and bolsters gender inequality in society writ large. Recent ruptures in the political sphere have ushered in a spurt of mobilization around the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. While it is clear that universities have their fair share of problems with harassment, solving that problem will not automatically produce equal opportunities or outcomes

[47] I thank Kathy Thelen for formulating this analogy.

for non-dominant groups.[48] Instead, there needs to be dispositional changes among current faculty (i.e., behavioral shifts) and policy changes within academic institutions to level the playing field in the academic career. I make three recommendations: reflexive inclusivity among faculty, equalizing pay, and attending to life cycle changes.

Reflexive Inclusivity

Life can be both easier and more fun when we gravitate toward people who share our backgrounds, cultural references, and values, and yet these practices are both exclusionary to newcomers and are also potentially harmful for discovery. Individuals who want to remedy these network-type inequalities can do a few things relatively simply. First, in your own courses assign more women. If you don't know whom to assign, look at recent prizes, series lists, or hires in your subfield. If that doesn't work, find a feminist. Most of us are more than happy to make recommendations for syllabi. And of course, the "Women Also Know Stuff" website is designed specifically to help you locate women who do research in a particular area. Second, if you want to check your references in a research paper, Jane Sumner recently developed a "Gender Balance Assessment Tool" (GBAT) that can quickly scan references and produce estimates of the proportion of female authors cited in your work.[49] To use this, you will need to keep first names in your syllabi and bibliographies, and you should note that the tool often slightly over-represents the proportion of women among authors. This tool seems like it might also come in handy for journal editors, and to department or university administrators that undertake the brave initiative to systematically study the gender composition of all taught course materials. Both of these actions – assigning more women and being sure to read and cite literature written by women, will help rectify the differential rates of visibility of male and female researchers.

[48] The largest professional association of American political scientists, APSA, recently conducted a survey of sexual harassment at the annual meeting where 2,424 members responded (18 percent response rate). The study found that while most members had not experienced harassment in the form of belittling, unwanted sexual advances, and inappropriate touching, 11 percent of female respondents and 3 percent of male respondents had experienced inappropriate sexual advances or touching (Sapiro and Campbell 2018).

[49] Historical gendered naming conventions may make it is easier to count, and therefore observe, gender differences, which may make it easier to shine a light on gender inequities than racial disparities. Some scholars in political science are working to predict ethnic and racial heritage from names. Interested readers are pointed to Khanna and Imai (2017).

Second, each discipline has to have conversations about which types of epistemological claims deserve pride of place (and my own intuitions suggest that political science cannot survive without qualitative research), yet I maintain that to the degree that our profession counts, we have to help the women find the beans. That is, we have to provide opportunities for women to do high-quality quantitative research. There are some simple fixes here. If you are a quanty-lady, write with your female students.[50] And if you are a man, look to see what proportion of your collaborators are women.[51] If it is not near 40 percent, women are under-represented in your own network, and you should work to include women on your research teams. Finally, as institutions craft plans for hiring, think of which women can lead your core metrics sequences or formal theory courses. We don't have enough data to tell us whether women teaching methods allows more women to excel in methods, but a large literature on gender and politics tells us that role models are key to success. At the very least, it's worth a try.

Equalizing Pay

Women and men should get equal pay for equal work. There is no justification for having a gap in research budgets or pay that relies on gendered conceptions of value. If a male assistant professor threatens to leave unless his salary is increased, allow the increase to be allocated only to the point at which all other faculty at that level are afforded an equal increase. This will seem preposterous to many men, but the reality is that gendered institutional arrangements, and not only their genius, have opened the door to the opportunity. Also, men should be asked why it is so important that they get paid more than women. In other words, we should be more transparent about pay not only so women can understand that they are under-paid, but to cultivate a sense among men that they are over-paid.[52] Second, when you are chair of the faculty, a dean, or on a hiring committee, recruit women that are married and those with kids as if they are a man, i.e., without thinking at all about whether

[50] Initiatives in political science, like "Visions in Methodology," which create networks for women who use quantitative methods are found by most attendees to be successful. See Barnes and Beaulieu (2017).

[51] Clusters of collaborators are often single-sex (Atchison 2017). As Tudor and Yashar (2018) find in their study of submissions to a top generalist journal in political science, *World Politics*, submissions that emanate from cross-rank collaborations, where scholars are at different levels of the academic hierarchy, tend to be same-gender more frequently than within-rank collaborations. If senior scholars initiate the collaboration, this finding might suggest same-sex preferences among mentors.

[52] A recent job market paper in economics (Langan 2018) finds that three to five years after a woman replaces a man as chair, the gender pay gap in economics and sociology is reduced by about a third. This happens through relative pay increases in women's salaries, not by lowering men's wages.

they might be moveable. Who knows, maybe she wants a divorce, or maybe she wants to change the gender division of labor in her own house. Maybe she simply wants a change. There is no way to know without actually trying.

Attending to the Life Cycle

Even with demographic changes in the direction of greater diversity, persistent differences in the rates of tenure for men and women paint a mixed story for the future of women's representation in these fields. Many scholars suggest that women's representation in academic institutions is stymied by organizational cultures meant to fit the work style and time demands of the unmarked group, i.e., white men.[53] Given that 30 years ago married white women with college degrees were much less likely to work outside the home than they are today, academic institutions were adapted to suit the lifestyle of a white man with the stay-at-home spouse.[54] Transformations in family forms, and the rise of two-earner couples among the educated classes, raise new problems for university faculty. These include the need to include major life cycle events – like the birth of children and the aging of parents – into the structure of employment benefits, and to create institutions within the profession that aid scholars with diverse household arrangements. Simple changes like holding meetings and workshops during the conventional work day, syncing university breaks with public school holidays, arranging for child care options at major conferences, and supplementing research budgets to pay for dependent care travel, have already been integrated by several institutions of higher learning.[55] Yet bigger reforms that might not only reflect changing realities of family composition, but also affect the gender division of labor within households, are still wanting.

In response to a desire to utilize women's labor power along with acknowledging women's outsized contribution to reproduction, many countries

[53] Wolfinger et al. (2008:390). Even today, male faculty are much more likely to have an at-home spouse. Jacobs (2004) reported that 89 percent of female faculty members had partners that were employed full-time, compared with 56 percent of male faculty.

[54] Notably, Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung pointed this out in the first preface to *The Second Shift* (1989).

[55] Some academic conferences offer child care (for a fee). And some universities, like Princeton, allow for research budgets to cover dependent care for people at all ranks who are engaging in research activities, including conference attendance. Harvard, Yale, and Cornell allow $1,000 per academic year for dependent care during academic travel for ladder faculty. Berkeley allows faculty to use existing research budgets. Other schools like Brown and Northwestern offer slightly lower amounts ($750). These data are thanks to the collective energies of the Academic Mama's Facebook group.

(excluding the United States) adopted generous leave policies for women, granting as much as a year off from work without the risk of losing one's job. But feminists and governments quickly realized that this made women much more expensive to hire, because women might take several year-long breaks from their firms.[56] Several countries have now shifted to more generous leaves for fathers (or non-bearing parents), and some even mandate use-it-or-lose-it leaves for men to try to ensure that dads are forced to engage in the process. Given the negative labor market consequences for women who take time out of the labor force, universities attempted to reduce the risk associated with hiring women, and increase incentives for men to parent, by allowing parents of any gender (bearing and non-bearing) and adoptive parents time off from teaching. Many have, moreover, adopted similar clock-"stoppage" policies that allow for a break in the tenure clock for both men and women after the arrival of a child.[57]

The research suggests that these well-meaning policies have several design flaws that may not actually be remediable. First, there is not a good model for aiding faculty whose children have out-of-the-ordinary care needs. Families where a child has a physical or mental disability, chronic health issues, or behavioral issues (something like 15–20 percent of all children) can have more intense care burdens than families with children without such issues. With special needs, the gendered patterns of care are exacerbated, and yet the even the most generous parental leave policies will be insufficient for faculty in the face of these challenges (although Columbia University, and perhaps other schools, allow for half-time work, but that would be at half-time pay).[58]

Second, in the event of children with average care needs, due to limited resources, many schools that employ two partners in a couple will only

[56] Goldin and Katz (2011). Morgan (2006) provides a detailed account of both the variation in leave policies across Western countries, as well as accounts of how they can influence employer incentives to hire and promote women.

[57] Parental leave policies vary widely by the type of institution. Small institutions with small departments may find it much more burdensome to allow for parental leave. See Ward and Wolf-Wendel (2012:chapter 10). Antecol et al. (2018) provide a list of changes in clock stoppage policies for 49 economics departments.

[58] Survey data show that one in five households with children has at least one child with special needs (DeRigne et al. 2017:2). Parish et al. (2004) find that mothers of children with disabilities were less consistently employed, less likely to have a full-time job later in life, and had lower lifetime savings than mothers without special-needs children. DeRigne et al. (2017) examine employment patterns in married couples. They show that both mothers' and fathers' absence from employment increases when they have a special-needs child, but that mothers are more likely to reduce work to accommodate a special-needs child. This research suggests that women with special-needs children may need special accommodations in the university setting.

provide leave for one of them. This means, most often, that women take the benefit, reinforcing women as the primary parent. In cases where both partners are allowed leave, universities often "stagger" the benefit, so that one parent doing "full-time" child care receives leave in one term while the other who does "full-time" child care can get it in another. The problem is that full-time parenting takes on a different meaning at different stages in an infant's development. In many cases, the bearing parent (the one who bore the child) will take the first leave. Recovering from labor, which increasingly involves surgery, learning how to feed a newborn (increasingly via the breast), and dealing with the most helpless of creatures means that a bearing parent's entire leave is spent in the trenches. She returns to teaching after four months out, probably still wearing early maternity clothes, and may be the child's only source of sustenance. The non-bearing parent gets his or her leave right when babies' naps become more predictable, and nighttime sleep may stretch out, leaving a bit of time for research on the side.

More egregiously, one hears many rumors around the water cooler of the man who used his entire parental leave for research, which may account for recent findings that gender-neutral clock-stopping policies increase the probability that men get tenure, but decrease the chance that women get promoted.[59] In fact, Antecol, Bedard, and Stearns (2018:table 6) find that men who start as assistant professors in departments with gender-neutral tenure clock-stoppage policies have 0.56 more top-five publications than men who start in institutions without such policies, while there is no increase in top-five publications for women under such policies. These findings are consistent with a model where men and women use parental leave in different ways, driving the growing gender gap in tenure rates. To deal with uneven reproductive burdens, but also encourage non-bearing parents to be fully involved in the early months of parenting, the easiest fix is allowing both parents, at the time of birth, to take the time off. And, in the case of stopping the clock, allow

[59] Antecol, Bedard, and Stearns (2018) examine the impact of "clock-stoppage" policies surrounding childbirth in 49 of the top 50 economics departments in the United States. They examine how female-only or gender-neutral policies impacted the employment history and publication patterns of more than 1,000 assistant professors hired into these departments from 1985 to 2004. Table 2 shows that men who came up under gender-neutral clock stoppage policies were 17.6 percentage points more likely to get tenure than men who came up before those policies were implemented, but that the gender gap in tenure rates grew by 37 percentage points after a neutral clock was adopted. Women who came up under gender-neutral policies were *less likely* to get tenure than women at the same university before the policy was implemented. Female-only clock-stoppage policies produced a small but imprecise gain for women. Note that the policies do not impact scholars' ability to get tenure in the profession, just at the initial institution where they were hired.

bearing parents two years off the clock as a way to account for the productivity lost during pregnancies, and to give women a genuine chance to catch up on their research.[60] (Twins, finally, should be treated like two separate children.)

Spousal hiring is another area where universities can intervene. Anecdotally, there is a perception that female academics, in addition to being more likely to have a high-powered spouse, are also more likely to be married to fellow academics.[61] To put it bluntly, gendered marital patterns mean that even when everyone is married to another academic, the woman will be more expensive to hire because her husband will need to make nearly as much as she does. Although many state schools have had success in faculty hiring and retention by addressing the spousal issue directly, the liberal arts colleges, which have fewer positions, are less able to do so. Many of the wealthiest research universities have the worst track records, perhaps because the notion of a "trailing" spouse suggests a sacrifice in quality.[62]

The remedy here is that universities should get on board with spousal hiring; it should be part of the budgeting process. Although people in other industries may balk at this notion, the geographical clustering and constraints of the academic job market make it a reality of the occupation. And just as firms want to retain talent, academic institutions should conceptualize retention in terms of the economic costs of turnover, not just in terms of salary. Just think, if you hire a couple, they will be happier, feel relatively richer (because they aren't paying for a commute) and may actually stay. To be truly great, institutions need employees who build community. Couples who are invested in the institution (who, frankly, will be harder to poach), may be excellent providers of public goods. This applies to same-sex couples as well as to different-sex couples.

[60] UC Berkeley, where Mary Ann Mason of "Do Babies Matter?" fame was the dean of the graduate division, adopted policies of this sort.

[61] Schiebinger, Henderson, and Gilmartin (2018); Jacobs (2004).

[62] UVA's dual-career faculty report argues that secondary spousal hires often play important roles in university life, including teaching in areas where the departments may not have had strength. At UVA, 86 percent of survey respondents reported being in a dual-career household, and a larger proportion of female faculty at all age groups reported this arrangement. Notably, at UVA, 33 percent of the dual-career spouses were employed by the university, while 13 percent were employed at a different university. http://uvacharge.virginia.edu/images/2015.12.14_FINAL_Dual_Career_Survey_Report.pdf.

Do We Need Women for Science?

For card-carrying feminists, the exclusion of women from sharing fully in the academic career is reason enough to care about gender domination in the academy. Justice itself is a worthy goal. But as a much-admired mentor of mine once barked: "What we do is science! Why do we need women for that?" This particular man was not against women – in fact, he had been an excellent mentor to many. But he balked at the notion that diversity in the academy was related to the specific mission of knowledge production. In that moment, like any self-possessed young woman might, I brushed off the comment. Which is to say I scoffed, made some argument back, and quickly changed the subject. But when I went home that night (and often since), I was struck by the absurdity of the claim. What we do is *social* science, and to do that well we absolutely need diversity.

Social science is about theorizing and documenting the regularities in human behavior, institutional formation, cooperation, and conflict that have hitherto constrained our civilizations. Society, though, is a living thing, and so a social science that is foremost concerned with predicting the future will likely fall short of its own aspirations. But just because we are not likely to become great at predicting the future, social scientists need not resign themselves to mere description. In what is perhaps the most famous statement distinguishing social science from philosophy, Karl Marx proclaimed that unlike for philosophers, our mission is not only to interpret the world, but to change it.

To my mind, the best way to change the world (fundamentally, to try to make it a better place) is to find the injustice – inequality, sexism, racism, elitism, and the like – and hammer repeatedly at the artifices that support it. But demolishing inequality does require some degree of prioritization. The Rawlsian maxim that we should look first to the improvement of the worst-off does not tell us much about how to determine what worst means. Given the sheer variety of inequalities that exist in the world, reasonable people can disagree about which ones are the most salient, about which axes of subordination are the most deserving of immediate attention. If, as Weber says, science can help you uncover facts, but it cannot tell you which questions to ask, then it is in deciding which questions to ask where lived experience proves key.

Generations of feminist, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist scholars have made this point: our positionality in the world system, our experiences of hate crime, violence, and disrespect, as well as inculcated patterns of cognitive processes, each stand to influence the normative concerns and the standpoint

that people bring to the table.[63] As the moral philosophers including Adam Smith have noted, injustices that are close to home may be sensed more acutely than those that are farther afield. Problems in our own households, places of worship, schools, or workplaces may prompt us to have unique concerns for or insights into our communities. Although there is nothing in practice keeping white men from thinking about the intersectional burdens that black women face when interacting with the criminal and legal justice systems, most white men have not thought much about it.[64]

Thus we see in the subfield of gender and politics an overwhelming majority of women, and in the subfield of race and politics a disproportionate amount of people of color. It isn't that gender and race don't affect white men, it is just that as the key beneficiaries of the system, they are less likely to think of those axes of subordination as the most important thing to study. To be sure, there is no prerequisite that women and people of color study eponymous subjects, but since values determine which questions we ask, it is not surprising that people from disadvantaged groups tend to cluster. But this creates problems for minority groups insofar as these subfields are "ghettoized," the topics and the people who study them are deemed out of the mainstream, and "me studies" gets pushed to the backwaters of the intellectual and economic value hierarchy. Ultimately, the power of the unmarked group is that they have been studying themselves all along, their knowledge confined to their own concerns, and yet they have had no need to justify it.

[63] "Standpoint" feminists, including Sandra Harding and Nancy Hartsock, argue that women's subordination in the world gives them a unique ability to understand and critique patriarchal systems of power, that is, that people of different social locations have different kinds of knowledge. This idea finds a parallel in social psychology, where an old line of research by Taylor and Fiske (1975) argues that perceptions of causality are related to the things to which people pay attention. In other words, we attribute causation and agency based on attending to specific people or phenomena. Together, attribution theory and standpoint epistemology suggest that people may have unique knowledge that others do not have access to, but that our own perceptions may be biased. Men's lack of understanding of women's standpoints may lead to a de-emphasis on the systematic hurdles women face.

[64] To be fair, many white men have studied race, but the theorization of "Intersectionality" – the way that people that sit at intersections of gender/race/class/ethnicity/and ability may experience institutions differently – emerged among black feminists and represents a foundational shift in feminist theory, empirical social science, and social movements discourse. There is so much written in this area, but Crenshaw (1989), Brown (2014), Hancock (2007, 2015), and Choo and Ferree (2010) can get you started.